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RAILROADS
The statistical record of monthly railroad revenues and expenses
is much longer than the quarterly record for manufacturing. It
gives us an adequate basis for separate generalizations about the
railroad industry such as we are not prepared to venture for
many of the twenty-two manufacturing industries.
For railways we have an approximate measure of the physical
volume of "production," namely traffic units. It consists of ton-
miles plus 2.4 times passenger-miles. The 2.4 factor is the average
ratio of revenue per passenger-mile to revenue per ton-mile over
a long period of years. Traffic units are therefore a roughly
price-weighted composite of the two main kinds of railway service.
Having this measure, we prefer to study the relation of margins,
prices, and costs to cycles in traffic rather than to cycles in railroad
revenues. In some respects, the following discussion will bring up
to date the findings in my monograph, American Transportation in
Prosperity and Depression (New York, NBER, 1948). Margins, how-
ever, were not discussed in that work; instead, attention was
focused on profits per unit.
Traffic Cycles Since 1938
Cycles in traffic correspond broadly to those in the economy at
large (Chart 15).' Railway passenger traffic, however, had been
greatly swollen during World War II because of large military
movement and because civilians could not buy new cars and could
buy gasoline only for "necessary" motor travel. Rail travel, there-
fore, declined not only in the immediate postwar business con-
traction but throughout the following expansion and into the next
contraction. The decline was so severe that the composite of
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freight and passenger movement also declined through all three
phases. Competition for freight traffic from motor and other
means of transport also became more formidable after the war; J
partlyat least for this reason, composite traffic ceased to expand
and began to contract early in the 1949—53, 1954—57, and j
1958—60business expansions.
As in other industries, we shall be interested to learn not only
what net changes occur in costs, prices, margins, and profits
during an upswing or downswing of traffic, but whether the
changes are dissimilar in the earlier and later portions of the
traffic fluctuations. A cycle in traffic can be divided into stages,
and therefore segments, as cycles in quantity sold or sales were
divided in preceding chapters. With monthly data, we divide the
months between a peak and a trough month into three successive
stages (stages II, III, IV or VI, VII, VIII), covering as nearly as
possible the same length of time, and strike a monthly average of
whatever variable is being studied, for each stage. We prefer to £
base the figure for a peak stage (V) or a trough stage (IX, I) not
only on data for the peak or trough month but also on data for
the preceding and following month.2 For example, the operating
ratio (a ratio explained in a later section) forJanuary 1956 is used
to compute the average ratio for stage V as well as for stage IV,
and the ratio for March 1956 enters the average both for stage V
and stage VI (Table 51).
Cost Inversely Related to Traffic
The cost experience of railroads was quite different from that of
manufacturing companies after the war. In all but two of the
twelve traffic expansions for which we have monthly data, there
was a net decline in operating expense per traffic unit. In every
one of the twelve contractions there was a net rise (Table 52).
Railroads are not immune to the rises in prices of materials and
wage rates, to which other industries are subjected in expansions.
Fluctuations in traffic do not differ greatly from those in manu-
2The traffic peak in June 1959, however, was followed by the steel strike, which
sharply reduced traffic and distorted the profit variables. Averages for this peak
are, therefore, based on figures for May and June only.RAILROADS 101
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IX April 1958 June 1958 3 81.0
aTrough, August 1954; peak, February 1956; trough, May 1958.
facturing production. We must conclude that increases in the
volume of business have a stronger tendency to reduce costs on
railroads than in factories, and declines in the volume of business
have a stronger tendency to raise them on railroads.
INVERSE RELATION MORE CONSISTENT
AT BEGINNING OF SWINGS IN TRAFFIC
Even on railroads there is some tendency for cost to rise as
traffic approaches its peak, and a decided tendency for it to fall as
traffic approaches its trough. Cost fell in all except one of the first
segments of the twelve expansions (Table 53). In later segments,
falls were less frequent. Cost rose in all first segments of contrac-
tion, in all but one of the second and third segments, and in seven
of the fourth segments. Rises were therefore more frequent than
falls in all segments, but the majority was close at the end.
Cost fell continuously from stage to stage in only three expan-
sions (Table 54). In four, it fell at the beginning but rose after the
second, third, or fourth stage. It rose continuously in five con-
tractions, and rose at first but declined later in another five.
Cost was lowest in the last stage of only five expansions. It was
highest in the last stage of five contractions, and in the fourth
stage of five others.
I
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TURN IN COST OFTEN PRECEDED TURN IN TRAFFIC
The foregoing data lead one to expect that a turn in cost often
should precede a turn of the opposite character intraffic.
Troughs in cost occurred before six of twelve traffic peaks. Peaks
in cost occurred before ten of twelve traffic troughs (Table 55).
In the 1932—37 expansion there are two "extra" turns in cost.
After declining as usual in the early months, cost began to rise
after July 1933, a peak in July 1935; they cannot be
matched with turns in traffic. Restoration of wage levels helps to
account for this extra movement in cost. Wages had been cut 10
TABLE 52
Cost (Railway Operating Expenses) Per Traffic Unit at Peaks and





Change in CostPer Unit
To Peak To Trough
Date Level (cents) from Troughfrom Peek
June 1908 Trough .5391 —— ——
Apr. 1910 Peak .5664 .0273 —
Mar. 1911 Trough .5782 —— .0118
Feb. 1913 Peak .5556 —.0226 ——
Dec. 1914 Trough .5885 — .0329
May1918 Peak .6746 .0861 —
Mar. 1919 Trough .9765 — .3019
Feb. 1920 Peak .9702 —.0063 —



















Aug. 1929 Peak .8694 —.0518 ——
Aug. 1932 Trough .8827 —— .0133
Mar. 1937 Peak .6975 —.1852
May1938 Trough .8113 —— .1138
Feb. 1944 Peak .6203 —.1910 ——
Oct. 1949 Trough 1.1615 —— .5412











May1958 Trough 1.2625 — .1693
June 1959 Peak 1.1760 —.0865 ——
2Q 1959 Peak 1.1796 — ——












With Rise With Fall Total
I II 1 11 12
II III 3 9 12
III IV 6 6 12
IV ' V 4 8 12
V VI 12 0 12
vi vii 11 1 12
VII VIII 11 1 12
VIII IX 7 5 12
I V 2 10 12
V IX 12 0 12
TABLE 54
Cost and Revenue Per Traffic Unit, Operating Ratio, and Profit:
Patterns of Change During Expansions and Contractions in Traffic,
1907—61
(number of phases)
per cent late in the preceding contraction. 2.5 points were re-
stored to the workers on July 1, 1934, another 2.5 on January 1,
1935, and the remaining 5 on April 1,





























































































0 0104 COST, PRICES, AND PROFITS
TABLE 55
Traffic and Cost Per Unit: Turning Points Compared, 1907—61
Turn in Traffic Turn in Cost
Level Date Level Date
LeadorLagaofCostat
TrafficPeak TrafficTrough
TroughJune 1908 Peak Oct.1907 —— —8
Peak Apr. 1910 TroughAug. 1909 —8 ——
Trough Mar. 1911 Peak Oct. 1912 —— +19
Peak Feb. 1913 TroughFeb. 1913 0 ——
TroughDec. 1914 Peak May1914 — —7
Peak May1918 TroughDec. 1915 —29 ——
TroughMar. 1919 Peak Apr. 1919 —— +1
Peak Feb. 1920 TroughAug. 1919 —6
TroughJuly 1921 Peak May1921 — —2
Peak Apr. 1923 TroughApr. 1923 0 ——
TroughJune 1924 Peak Oct. 1923 —— —8
Peak July 1926 TroughJuly 1926 0 —
Trough Dec. 1927 Peak July 1927 —— —5
Peak Aug. 1929 TroughFeb. 1929 —6 ——
Trough Aug. 1932 Peak June 1932 —— —2
TroughJuly 1933 —— ——
Peak July 1935 —— ——
Peak Mar. 1937 TroughMar. 1937 0 ——
Trough May1938 Peak Feb. 1938 —— 3
Peak Feb. 1944 TroughOct. 1942 —16
Trough Oct. 1949 Peak Oct. 1949 — 0
Peak Feb. 1952 TroughOct. 1950 —16 ——
TroughAug. 1954 Peak Dec. 1953 —— —8
Peak Feb. 1956 TroughFeb. 1956 0 ——
Trough May1958 Peak Apr. 1958 —— —1
Peak June 1959 TroughJune 1959 0 ——
Trough 4Q 1960 Peak 30 1960 —— —3
SUMMARY
ofpeaks in trafficwith:
Earlier trough in cost 6
Coinciding trough in cost 6
Later trough in cost 0
Number of troughs in traffic withi
Earlier peak in cost 10
Coinciding peak in cost 1






aNumber of months by which turn in cost preceded C—)
of opposite character in traffic units.
or followed (+) turn
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Hours Per Unit and Labor Cost
Inversely Related to Traffic
Monthly figures on man-hours and compensation of railroad
workers are available for eight traffic expansions and contractions,
beginning in 1921. There was a net fall in man-hours per traffic
unit in all expansions, and a net rise in most contractions (Table
56). Hourly earnings, on the other hand, rose in all but one of the
expansions and contractions. But in the upswings, the rise in
earnings was not large enough to offset the fall in hours per unit:
labor cost per traffic unit fell in all of them. In the downswings, of
course, the rise in hourly pay reinforced the effect of rising hours
per unit on cost.
TABLE 56
Man-Hours Per Traffic Unit, Hourly Earnings, and Labor Cost Per
Traffic Unit: Direction of Change from Stage to Stage








































































































The inverse relation between hours per unit or labor cost and
traffic is strongest at the beginning of an upswing or downswing
in traffic. Hours per unit fell in a majority of the second and
fourth segments of traffic contractions. Labor cost rose in most
cases in all segments, but less frequently in the last segment of
traffic declines than in the first.
Hours per unit fell continuously from stage to stage in six of
the eight traffic expansions (Table 57). Hourly earnings rose
I -
I106 COST, PRICES, AND PROFITS
continuously in five of the eight traffic contractions. Labor cost
had a continuous fall in three expansions, and a fall-rise pattern




















Continuous rise 0 0 1 5 0 4
Rise,fall 0 3 2 2 0 2
Rise, fall,rise 0 2 1 0 0 2
Rise, fall,rise,fall 0 3 1 0 0 0
Continuous fall 6 0 0 0 3 0
Fall,rise 1 0 2 1 3 0
Fall, rise, falL 1 0 1 0 2 0
Fall, rise, fall,rise 0 0 0 0 0 0
Direction of Change Same in Labor and Total Cost
Total operating cost per traffic unit changed in the same direction
as labor cost per traffic unit in all eight traffic expansions, and in
all contractions except 1929— 32. From the 1929 peak stage to the
1932 trough stage, labor cost declined a little (2.2 per cent) while
total cost increased a little (1.5 per cent). These are net changes.
Between successive stages of this contraction (from V to VI, VI to
VII, etc.) the directions do not differ. Both labor and total cost
rose in the first three segments of the contraction, and fell in the
fourth. The decline in labor cost in the fourth segment was more
than sufficient to offset the previous rises; the decline in total cost
was insufficient. Data for all cycles make possible sixty-four com-
parisons of changes during segments of cycles. The direction of
change in labor and total cost is similar in all but one. From the
fourth to the fifth stages of the 1954—56 traffic expansion, labor
cost rose 2.1 per cent while total cost fell 2.2 per cent.
TABLE 57
Man-Hours Per Traffic Unit, Hourly Earnings, and Labor Cost Per
Traffic Unit: Patterns of Change During




1Little or Inverse Relation Between Rate Level and Traffic
Railroads provide an almost infinite variety of services, each of
which has its price. They carry nearly every commodity and they
carry each between various pairs of places. They carry passengers
and mail, and collect minor portions of their revenue from still
other sources. Although much is done to simplify matters by
grouping commodities, origins, and destinations, the prices of
railway services form a complex system; and no really precise
index describing percentage changes in the average level of the
whole system over short periods of time has ever been constructed.
I have elsewhere argued, however, that a rough substitute, revenue
per traffic unit, is useful in analyzing cyclical changes.4
Revenue per traffic unit, unlike prices in manufacturing, has
shown no tendency to rise and fall with the volume of business
done (Table 58). It rose in four of the twelve traffic expansions
for which we have monthly data, but fell in the other eight. It fell
in only three of the traffic contractions, and rose in the other nine.
Many of the net changes were slight, and might be accounted
for by changes in the composition of traffic. The larger increases
in contractions are accounted for by general changes in the level
of rates authorized in proceedings before the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. During the World War II expansion, traffic
increased so greatly, and the effect of increased volume on costs
was so favorable, that railroads were able to operate profitably at
prewar freight rates (passenger fares were increased a little).
After the war, however, railroads suffered not only from the
brief postwar recession, but from the loss of abnormal wartime
traffic and the diversion of peacetime traffic to other means of
transport, as well as from rising wage rates and prices of materi-
als. Falling volume and inflation threatened them with insolvency;
they asked for, and the Interstate Commerce Commission au-
thorized, a series of general increases in freight rates (Table 59).










Change in RevenuePer Unit
To Peak To Trough
Date Level (cents) from Trough from Peak
June 1908 Trough .7987 —— ——
Apr. 1910 Peak .8409 .0422 ——
Mar. 1911 Trough .8410 —— .0001
Feb. 1913 Peak .7924 —.0486 ——
Dec. 1914 Trough .8160 —— .0236
May1918 Peak .8821 .0661 ——
Mar. 1919 Trough 1.1251 —— .2430
Feb. 1920 Peak 1.1455 .0204 ——
July 1921 Trough 1.4401 —— .2946
Apr. 1923 Peak 1.2320 —.2081 ——
June 1924 Trough 1.2669 —— .0349
July 1926 Peak 1.2237 —.0432 ——
Dec. 1927 Trough 1.2090 —— —.0147
Aug. 1929 Peak 1.2238 .0148 ——
Aug. 1932 Trough 1.1299 —— —.0939
Mar. 1937 Peak .9862 —.1437 ——
May1938 Trough 1.0450 —— .0588
Feb. 1944 Peak .9516 —.0934 —
Oct. 1949 Trough 1.4430 —— .4914
Feb. 1952 Peak 1.4418 —.0012 ——
Aug. 1954 Trough 1.5161 —— .0743
Feb. 1956 Peak 1.4364 —.0797 —
May1958 Trough 1.5577 — .1213
June 1959 Peak 1.5482 —.0095 ——
201959 Peak 1.5527 —— ——
4Q1960 Trough 1.5324 —— —.0203
8Th ree—month averages.
creased about 57 per cent over the rates in effect on June 30, 1946
(substantially the prewar rates). Other general postwar increases
also occurred, mostly during traffic contractions. In consequence
of these general increases, the curve of revenue per traffic unit
rises very steeply in the 1946—49 portion of the postwar traffic
contraction and in the 1956—58 contraction (Chart 16).6
Therises in Table 59 are somewhat exaggerated because state
railroad commissions may not have allowed them to become fully
effective on intrastate traffic and because the railroads cut many
rates to meet competition of other forms of transport. The pat-
tern of step-by-step rises suggested by the precise dates does not
show up in the chart of revenue per unit because there were also
6For charts of unit revenue and cost from 1907 to 1938, see American Transporta-
tion, pp. 234, 275.
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TABLE 58













During traffic contraction, Feb. 1944to Oct. 1949
July 1, 1946 6.5 6.5
January 1, 1947 17.6 11.1
October 1.947 28.1 10.5
January 5. 1948 37.8 9.7
May 6, 1948 42.8 5.0
August 21, 1948 44.2 1.4
January 11, 1949 517 7.5
Sepreriber 1, 1949 57.3 5.6
Total 57.3
During traffic expansion, Oct. 1949 toFeb. 1952
April 4, 1951. 61.1 3.8
August 28, 1951 67.6 6.5
Total 10.3
During traffic contraction, Feb. 1952to Aug. 1954
May 2, 1952 78.9 11.3
During traffic contraction, Feb. 1956to May 1958
March 7, 1956 88.8 9.9
28, 1956 or Feb. 23, 1957 98.2 9.4
August 26, 1957 1.07.7 9.5
Total 28.8
During traffic expanBion, May 1958toJune 1.959
September iS, 1958 112.1 4.4
rises in passenger fares, and because of changes in the composi-
tion of traffic.
A coal strike in April and May 1946 provided a salient instance
of such a change in composition. Revenue per ton-mile from this
commodity is low compared with the average received for the
movement of other commodities. When a large part of this traffic
disappeared, over-all revenue per traffic unit showed a sharp
temporary rise (Chart 16).
Changes in the general level of railway rates, fares, and charges
are small except in times of inflation or intensifying competition
from other means of transport. Serious inflation occurred only in
postwar periods. Competition from other means of transport has
been more influential in some cycles than in others. It had no no-
ticeable influence on general rate levels before, say, 1928, and none
during the World War II expansion; its effects are quite notice-
able in the 1954—56 expansion. There is no systematic difference
•1ci
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in frequency of change between early and late expansion or con-
traction (Table 60). Revenue per unit has not followed any simple
and consistent pattern in successive segments of traffic cycles
(Table 54).
TABLE 60
Revenue Per Traffic Unit (Price): Direction of Change from

























































Operating Margin Usually Rises
and Falls With Traffic
In proportion to their revenues, railroads own much more prop-
erty than most other industries. To provide the money to build
their properties, they relied largely on long-term borrowing.
Present operating railroad companies have taken over properties
formerly operated independently by other companies, paying
fixed rents for the use of these properties. Consequently, in this
industry an unusually large proportion of revenue goes to pay
interest, rent, and property taxes. In the aggregate, these outlays
fluctuate very little with fluctuations in traffic. In railway statistics,
operating expenses —mainlylabor and materials —havelong been
shown separately from taxes and fixed charges. Analysts of rail-
way finances have been accustomed to use the operating ratio
—thepercentage ratio of operating expenses to operating rev-
enues—as a key figure. To distinguish the more from the less
variable deductions from revenue, it would be more logical to
exclude depreciation from operating expenses and to include
IaThree_monthaverages.
payroll taxes, which vary with labor expense. These adjustments
are not customary, however, and we shall follow the custom.
In ten of twelve expansions in traffic since 1908, the operating
ratio fell from the initial trough in traffic to the peak. In ten of
twelve contractions, it rose from the peak to the terminal trough
(Table 61). One may call the difference between 100 and the
operating ratio the operating margin; obviously, it rises and falls
with traffic.
MARGIN OFTEN MOVES CONTRARY TO TRAFFIC
IN LATE EXPANSION OR CONTRACTION
The operating ratio rose only once during the first segment of
an expansion (Table 62). Rises were slightly more frequent in the
second segment, and more frequent in the third and fourth
c(
I
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TABLE 61




To Peak To Trough
Date Level (per cent) from Trough from Peak
June 1908 Trough 67.5 —— ——
Apr. 1910 Peak 67.3 —0.2 ——
Mar. 1911 Trough 68.8 — 1.5
Feb. 1913 Peak 70.1 1.3 ——
Dec. 1914 Trough 72.2 —— 2.1
May1918 Peak 87.1 14.9 ——
Mar. 1919 Trough 86.8 — —0.3
Feb. 1920 Peak 85.0 —1.8 ——
July 1921 Trough 82.1 —— —2.9
Apr. 1923 Peak 75.6 —6.5 ——
June 1924 Trough 77.7 —— 2.1
July 1926 Peak 71.8 —5.9 ——
Dec. 1927 Trough 76.2 —— 4.4
Aug. 1929 Peak 71.0 —5.2 ——
Aug. 1932 Trough 78.5 —— 7.5
Mar. 1937 Peak 70.9 —7.6 —
May1938 Trough 77.4 — 6.5
Feb. 1944 Peak 65.2 —12.2 ——
Oct. 1949 Trough 80.5 — 15.3
Feb. 1952 Peak 75.9 —4.6 ——
Aug. 1954 Trough 79.7 —— 3.8
Feb. 1956 Peak 76.1 —3.6 ——
May1958 Trough 81.0 —— 4.9
June 1959 Peak 76.0 —5,0 ——
2Q 1959 Peak 76.0 —— ——
4Q 1960 Trough 80.1 —— 4.1RAILROADS 113
segments. The ratio rose in all but one of the first segments of
contractions; this is the period when a rising operating ratio is
most common. Rises are less frequent thereafter. They outnum-
bered declines, however, in all four segments.
TABLE 62
Railway Operating Ratio: Direction of Change from

























































Translating these findings into terms of the operating margin,
it appears that the latter almost always widens in the first segment
of an upswing in traffic, but rises become less frequent thereafter.
It very seldom rises in the first segment of a contraction, but rises
are not uncommon in the last three segments.
TURNS IN MARGIN OFTEN LEAD TURNS
IN TRAFFIC
In most cases there was a peak in the operating ratio near each
trough in traffic, and a trough in the operating ratio near each
peak in traffic (Chart 17). As one might expect from the foregoing
sections, where turns can be paired, the turn in the ratio often
precedes the turn of opposite character in traffic. Troughs in the
ratio preceded traffic peaks in six of nine pairs of turns (Table 63).
Peaks in the ratio preceded traffic troughs in eight of ten pairs.
Every peak in the operating ratio is a trough in the operating
margin, and vice versa. The operating margin, therefore, often




































































































































































































Turn in Traffic Operating Ratio
Level Date Level Date
LeadorLaga of Ratioat
TrafficPeakTrafficTrough
TroughJune 1908 Peak Nov. 1907 —— —7
Peak Apr. 1910 TroughNov. 1909 —5 ——
TroughMar. 1911
Peak Feb. 1913 —
Trough Dec. 1914 Peak Feb. 1914 —— —10
Peak May1918 Trough Dec. 1915 —29 —
Trough Mar. 1919 —————— ————
Peak Feb. 1920
Trough July 1921 Peak AUg. 1920 —— —11
Peak Apr. 1923———— ——————— ——
Trough June 1924—
Peak July1926 TroughJuly 1926 0 ——
Trough Dec.1927 Peak Dec. 1927 0
Peak Aug. 1929 Trough Dec.1928 —8 —
Trough Aug. 1932 Peak July 1932 —1
TroughJune 1933
—— Peak July 1935
Peak Mar. 1937 TroughMar. 1937 0
Trough May1938 Peak Feb. 1938 —— 3
Peak Feb. 1944 TroughApr. 1943 —10
— Peak May1946
TroughJuly 1948
TroughOct. 1949 Peak Oct. 1949 0
——— TroughDec. 1950
Peak July 1951
Peak Feb.1952 TroughSep. 1952 7
TroughAug. 1954 Peak Dec.1953 — 8
Peak Feb. 1956 TroughMar. 1955 —11 ——
Trough May1958 Peak Feb. 1958 —— —3
Peak June 1959 TroughDcc. 1958 —6 ——
Trough 4(71960 Peak 301960 —— —3
SUII-thRY .
Number of peaks in traffic with:
Earlier trough in ratio










Number of troughs in traffic with:
Earlier peak in ratio 8
Coinciding peak in Tatio 2
Later peak in ratio 0




aNumber of months by which turn in ratio preceded (—)
ofopposite kind in traffic.
or followed (+) turn116 COST, PRICES, AND PROFITS
Cost Factor Usually Dominates
Operating Ratio and Margin
In seven of the twelve expansions, prices received (revenue per
traffic unit) fell, but cost per traffic unit fell by a greater percent-
age (Table 64). Lower cost rather than higher prices, therefore,
account for half of the declines in the operating ratio. In two
other cases, cost fell and price rose. Falling cost was therefore the
sole factor in the operating-ratio decline in seven instances and a
contributing factor in two. A rise in price was the sole factor in
only one instance.
In seven of the twelve contractions, the operating ratio rose in
spite of rising prices; cost per traffic unit rose by a greater per-
centage. In three, prices fell and cost rose. No rise in the ratio was
caused by a fall in prices received accompanied by a smaller fall in
cost.
Similar conclusions result if the data are examined segment by
segment in every cycle of traffic. With six possible combinations of
change and only twelve observations for each segment, an attempt
to discuss progressive changes from segment to segment in the
comparative frequency of the various combinations would not be
justified. It is fair,' however, to count their frequency in all seg-
ments (Table 64). A rise in cost, accompanied by some, but not an
offsetting, rise in price, accounts for most stage-to-stage rises in
the operating ratio. A fall in cost, accompanied by some, but not
an offsetting, fall in price, accounts for most stage-to-stage de-
clines in the ratio.
The dominating influence of cost is perhaps more clearly illus-
trated if we leave changes in unit revenue out of account (Table
65). Thirty of the thirty-four stage-to-stage declines in cost during
expansions were reflected in the operating ratio. Thirty-one of
the forty-one rises in cost during contractions were reflected in
the ratio. Cost and the ratio move together, both up or both
down, in seventy-six of the ninety-six stage-to-stage observations
in the table.
At least four of the thirteen instances in which cost rose but the
operating ratio fell are accounted for by general increases in rates.
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TABLE 65

































































































(Charts 16 and 17)it appears that the broad movements of cost
and the ratio are similar. During the twenty-six months from May
1946 to July 1948, the fourteen months from July 1951 to Sep-
tember 1952, and the nine months from August 1920 to May
1921, however, the general drift of cost per unit was upward, but
that of the ratio was downward. These are the longest periods
with cost rising but the ratio falling. In each of the three periods,
general rate increases were made.
From the foregoing, it appears that rises in cost per traffic unit
have usually been accompanied by declines in the operating profit
margin, and vice versa. Cost has never risen for a considerable
period without producing a decline in margin, except when the
rise in cost was so great that general increases in the rate level
were deemed necessary.
Pre-Tax Margin Fluctuates More
Than Operating Margin
The profit margin as we defined it in Chapter 1 differs from the
operating margin that we have discussed in this chapter. Pre-tax
income (j) equals net operating revenue (c) plus miscellaneous
7See also my American Transportation, Chart 95.
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income (g)minusnet rents (d),taxaccruals (e and f), fixed charges
(h), and other deductions (i) in Table 66. Miscellaneous income,
net rents, and payroll tax accruals tend to fluctuate, in the ag-
gregate, with traffic or business conditions. Fixed charges, tax
accruals other than payroll and U.S. income taxes, and other de-
ductions, on the other hand, tend to change very slowly, in the
aggregate. Consequently one might expect the net change in the
pre-tax margin during an upswing or downswing of traffic to be
wider than the net change in the operating margin, and so it was
in eight of the ten comparisons we can make (Table 67—monthly
data on the final margin begin in 1931).
The first of the two exceptions occurred in the 1944—49 con-
traction of traffic. During these years, eighteen Class I railways
emerged from receivership or trusteeship. For one, the end meant
sale of its assets to another road; for a second, it meant the aban-
donment of operations. Reorganization reduced the long-term
debt of the other sixteen from $2,424 million shortly before the
end of the receivership or trusteeship to $1,255 million shortly
after. Elimination of debt reduced aggregate interest charges.
Roads that were not in the wringer, moreover, were able to refund
old obligations at lower rates of interest. On December 31, 1943
the average rate of interest on all outstanding long-term debt was
4.15 per cent; by December 31, 1949, it had fallen to 3.68 per cent.
The other exception occurred in the expansion of 1954—56,
when the final margin increased by a somewhat smaller increment
than the operating margin. Without seasonally adjusting the inter-
mediate items, which would be laborious, it is impossible to explain
this exception.
Although the final margin tends to fluctuate more widely than
the operating margin, the direction of change is similar. All the
net changes over traffic phases are n the same direction (Table 67).
All troughs in the operating ratio can be matched with nearby
peaks in the final margin, and vice versa (Chart 17 and Chart
18). In eight of seventeen pairs, the dates of opposite turns coin-
cide. In most of the others, the interval between the earlier and
later turn is short, one or two months. The directions of change
from one stage of a traffic cycle to the next are opposite in thirty-
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c.Net revenue from railway operations, a—b
d.Rents for equipment and joint facilitiesb
e.Railway tax accruals:payroll
f.Railway tax accruals:other (except U.S. income taxes)
g.Miscellaneous inconEc
h.Fixed charges (rent for leased roads, fixed interest, etc.)
1.Other deductions (contingent interest, etc.)
j.Net income before U.S. income taxes. (c+g) —(d-4-e+f+h+i)
k.U.S. income taxes
1.Net income
m.Operating ratio, 100 x b/a
n.Operating margin,100x c/a
o.Margin, 100 x i/a


















bpayments by allroads minus receipts of all.
income minus miscellaneousdeductions.
TABLE 67






Date Level(per cent) Margin Ratio Margin
Aug.1932Trough —7.5 —— —— ——
Mar.1937Peak 7.6 15.1 —7.6 7.6
May1938Trough —5.1 —12.7 6.5 —6.5
Feb.1944 Peak 21.6 26.7 —12.2 12.2
Oct.1949Trough 7.0 —14.6 15.3 —15.3
Feb.1952 Peak 14.6 7.6 —4.6 4.6
Aug.1954 Trough 9.0 —5.6 3.8 —3.8
Feb.1956Peak 12.2 3.2 —3.6 3.6
May 1958Trough 5.9 -6.3 4.9 4.9
June1959 Peak 11.2 5.3 —5,0 5.0
20 1959 Peak 11.6 —— —— ——
40 1960Trough 3.8 —7.8 4.1 —4.1RAILROADS 121
change in operating ratio and final margin, of course, means con-
sistently similar change in the operating margin and final margin.
Profits More Closely Related Than
Margins to Traffic
Rising traffic, accompanied by rising revenue, can sometimes
cause profits to rise even though the aggregate margin declines.
The operating margin rose in eleven of twelve first segments of
expansion; net operating revenue rose in all twelve (Table 68).
For other segments the corresponding figures are, respectively,
second segments, ten, ten; third segments, live, nine; fourth
segments, seven, ten. There was a net rise in operating margin
during ten expansions, and in operating profit during eleven.
Falling traffic, usually accompanied by falling revenue, some-
times results in falling profits even when margins are rising. The
number of first and second segments of contraction with a fall in
operating margin, however, was the same as the number with a
fall in operating profit. But the margin declined in only seven
third segments and eight fourth, while profits fell in nine. The
number of net declines over a contraction as a whole was the same
for operating profits as for operating margins.
TABLE 68
Operating Profits (Net Operating Revenue): Direction of Change







I II 12 0 12
II III 10 2 12
III IV 9 3 12
IV V 10 2 12
V VI 1 11 12
VI VII 4 8 12
VII VIII 3 9 12
VIII IX 3 9 12
I V 11 1 12
































































































































































































In thirty-seven of the forty comparisons we can make, the
direction of stage-to-stage change in net income before taxes was
the same as in net railway operating revenue. The net changes
over a traffic expansion or contraction as a whole were in the same
direction in all ten instances.
1